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
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Analytical Support Across the Range of Military Operations

Major George D. Kinter

21 March 2011

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Richard DiNardo', written over a horizontal line.

Dr. Richard DiNardo

6 April 2011

Date

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Paul D. Gelpi', written over a horizontal line.

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6 April 2011

Date

## **Executive Summary**

In Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, the Commandant directed that the Marine Corps would begin transition back to its amphibious roots. This paper takes a look at the innovations pertaining to intelligence analysis that the Marine Corps has made in operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as planned structure based on the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISR-E). The purpose of this paper is to assess how well the MCISR-E will provide all-source analytical support for the full Range Of Military Operations (ROMO) as the Marine Corps returns to its amphibious roots.

This paper provides a substantial amount of information on the company level intelligence cells (CLIC) primarily because of the role it plays as a key enabler to both the Marine Corps' enhanced company operations concept and counterinsurgency operations. This abundance of information on the CLIC is not meant to place any level of importance on this effort over any of the other parts of the MCISR-E.

Leaders are often faced with decisions on how to allocate resources. As the Marine Corps Intelligence Community transitions to the MCISR-E and turns to implementing changes to support the Marine Corps' return to its amphibious roots, the intelligence community will need to focus resources to support operations. This paper examines the decisions affecting intelligence analysis to explore how well these decisions will support operations across the ROMO. As mentioned in the introduction Warfare is broken into conflicts involving regular and irregular tactics. This paper narrows the examination of operations across the ROMO to counterinsurgency, conventional combat, and hybrid warfare.

In the final sections, the paper includes several recommendations for ensuring that the Marine intelligence community evolves in step with the rest of the force in response to emerging trends in the changing character of warfare. A key component of this evolution is to understand that intelligence analysis plays a key role in operations against enemies employing irregular warfare. With this in mind, experience and capabilities gained in Iraq and Afghanistan like the company level intelligence cell should be institutionalized. As these lower level units will likely not have the benefit of efforts to professionalize analysis capabilities to include greater cultural understanding and prescribed problem solving methods, analysts at higher levels should be given the freedom to move to the information. Lastly, tension between supporting conventional and irregular aspects of the operation will necessitate that leaders dynamically prioritize intelligence assets based on changes in the environment over the course of the campaign.

## **Introduction**

In *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025*, the Commandant directed that the Marine Corps would begin transition back to its amphibious roots. The focus of this paper is to look at the innovations pertaining to intelligence analysis that the Marine Corps has made in operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as plans to introduce to the intelligence structure through the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISR-E). The purpose of this paper is to assess how well the MCISR-E will provide all-source analytical support for the full range of military operations as the Marine Corps returns to its amphibious roots.

For most of the last decade, the Marine Corps has focused on combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the meantime, much has changed in the operating environment and what is corporately believed about the future characteristics of the conflicts the Marine Corps will face.

Although nothing suggests that the nature of war will change, the Marine Corps Vision & Strategy identifies adjustments to the force needed to effectively combat enemy forces employing new tactics based on emerging trends in the character of war. To put the matter into proper perspective, during his confirmation hearing with the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen Amos indicated that while the Marine Corps has been continuously supporting combatant commanders with Marine Expeditionary Units, the amount of effort supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been detrimental to our competency in amphibious operations.<sup>1</sup>

While it is understood and agreed upon that Clausewitz theory of the nature of war remains unchanged, it is helpful to make distinctions in types of warfare because of the broad characteristics that warfare can assume. The method of this paper will be to examine how the concept behind these innovations will meet requirements across the range of military operations by looking at high intensity combat and counter-insurgency. An assessment of the future indicates that enemy forces will increasingly mix aspects of irregular warfare and conventional warfare, into a hybrid warfare. While the future force structure of the Marine Corps will be optimized for center of the range of range of military operations, known as Crisis Response, active duty personnel will be prepared for more towards the left side of the chart below and reservists will augment capabilities to support operations on the right side of the chart below.




Figure 1 - Range of Military Operations (from the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 2.0, JCS, August 2005 page 10)

## Background

The Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 and the Marine Corps Operating Concept, outline an assessment of the future operating environment including an assessment that hybrid warfare will be the most likely form of conflict that enemies of the United States will pursue. Potential peer competitors recognize the advantages of the ability to project the power of a technologically advanced conventional force, while at the same time grasp the need to develop doctrine to

counter U.S. technological advantages, most likely employing asymmetric methods and preemption or surprise attack as ways of trying to bypass superior conventional forces.<sup>2</sup> Hybrid Wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.

The crux of the problem that the U.S. government and DoD faces is that it must maintain the ability to wage successful campaigns against both conventionally armed states and non state actors employing irregular tactics. “The future demands a military organization *that is agile and adaptive in its approach* to the unique conditions each conflict poses. By virtue of its relatively small size and flexible structure, maritime orientation, – *the Marine Corps has the opportunity to pioneer decentralized and agile responses to a wider set of contingencies across* the full spectrum of conflict.”<sup>3</sup> But in reality, the Marine Corps will not have the resources to train continuously for the entire spectrum over the range of military operations, especially given the state of the United States government’s finances. The direction approved by the commandant is clearly for the Marine Corps to pursue the center of the range, focusing on the Crisis response and access assurance missions outlined in the Marine Corps Operating Concepts.<sup>4</sup>

The Marine Operating Concepts develops ideas to get the force thinking about how the Marine Corps will operate in the future. A key concept for preparing for the anticipated threats is enhanced MAGTF operations. In order for the Marine Corps to provide forces that are able to solve complex military problems and adapt to the ambiguities of the cultural environment in counterinsurgency operations, “Countering dispersed adversaries employing hybrid tactics will require multiple, simultaneous, and distributed actions by amphibious forces throughout the littoral region.”<sup>5</sup>

In addition to a diminished amphibious capability within the Marine Corps, future potential enemies have been watching and taking note of weaknesses in the American way of battle. As advances in technology and other trends in the environment become a reality, irregular warfare tactics will become more lethal to a conventionally postured force. The approach currently advocated by Joint doctrine is to seek partnerships with the other government agencies, multinational partners, and the host nation in the case of a war against a non-state actor.<sup>6</sup>

The concept of distributed operations will allow the Marine rifle companies to operate autonomously working off of a commander's intent and utilizing dominance in the information domain to deny the enemy critical need to exploit the local populace. This technique was pioneered by the Marine Corps in Nicaragua and encapsulated in the *Small Wars Manual*. Later, the Marine Corps resurrected and refined their small wars concepts in Vietnam as their combined action platoons which have become the basis for distributed operations.<sup>7</sup>

In Iraq, the Marine Corps faced an enemy that employed both regular and irregular tactics; however, these sets of tactics were employed at distinctly different phases of the campaign and by different enemy components. The current trends indicate that on the battlefield of the future, the Marine Corps will face an enemy employing both tactic sets on the same battlefield, simultaneously. The scenario will be new and challenging, but the components are not unfamiliar. In fact, the last decade of combat operations have given the Marine Corps a wealth of experience in dealing with some of the most challenging irregular tactics. Developments in the analytical components of the Marine Corps have been instrumental in the successes in both Iraq and Afghanistan.



## **Analysis in Iraq and Afghanistan**

A needed innovation that has arisen from a combination of employing distributed operations and the counterinsurgency environment is the Company Level Intelligence Cell (CLIC). The CLIC is a very effective program providing an intelligence capability to an infantry company to take advantage of the amount of information available to the company through direct and sustained contact that distributed operations provides. When tied in properly, the CLIC also provides critical feedback to the battalion intelligence shop. This needs to be worked carefully, as the CLIC is a company asset and does not belong to the battalion S2.<sup>8</sup> The consensus garnered from after action reports from units deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that, in a COIN fight, effective intelligence operations are more important than massing combat firepower.<sup>9</sup>

The CLICs employed in both Iraq and Afghanistan are typically comprised of six Marines. The battalion S-2 shop normally provides an intelligence analyst to each company. The companies then designate five Marines out of their platoons to fill out the rest of the CLIC staffing. Each platoon takes one of the CLIC Marines as a platoon representative to conduct patrol out briefs and debriefs and capture key engagements with the local populace. The effectiveness of the actual implementation is personality driven and puts company commander's in a dilemma between choosing Marines that will best support operations while not diminishing unit cohesion by removing capable Marines from their platoons and normal duties. Typically, companies look for Marines that show an aptitude for analytical skills by identifying guys that enjoy solving puzzles and are known to think outside the box. When companies get the right people into their intelligence cells, the results noted from battalion intelligence officers are decent predictive

analysis products and story boards supporting raids and detainments instead of just compiling and organizing a database of information<sup>10</sup>

In some instances, company commanders relied on their intelligence cells to develop IPB for their particular AOs, keeping up-to-date information on the operating environment including emerging changes in power dynamics within the local tribes. The CLICs were also relied upon to handle turnovers with incoming units, building and maintaining turnover packages throughout their deployment.<sup>11</sup> The more mature CLICs were able to analyze trends and predict potential future events, produce targeting packages. They also put together Link Analysis charts both for the company and to feed information to the larger picture at the battalion, incorporating story boards, detainments or arrest packages. Arrest packages created by the CLICs were used as evidence packages against the detainees at Criminal Courts.<sup>12</sup>

As the CLIC concept has progressed, they have begun to disseminate intelligence go higher through daily intelligence summaries, including two or three sentence, summaries of all of their patrols and activity for the day, enemy activity, Significant Activity (SIGACT), and an assessment of what was going on in the area of operations. They also produce engagement notes summarizing meetings with key leaders including police chiefs, tribal Sheiks, and government officials<sup>13</sup>

Due to the importance of gaining and maintaining the support of the local populace, some battalion commanders retained kinetic target package approval at the battalion level. The battalion intelligence officer and operations officer made the decision to capture a target. While this goes against decentralized control, in a COIN fight it is important to capture/kill the correct targets based on vetted intelligence reporting. The CLICs were used to provide critical input to

the targeting; however, the company's were not authorized to conduct unilateral intelligence driven targeting, thus preventing unnecessary detainments of individuals.

Interestingly, one of the main pieces that higher could bring to bear is ISR assets; however, reports from Iraq indicated that only five to ten percent of the information that the battalion intelligence shops used to gain a comprehensive understanding of the environment came from ISR assets.<sup>14</sup> Some of the deployed units were unprepared for the gamut of ISR assets, aside from the organic Ravens, available in theater, having never been exposed to them beforehand. The Scan Eagles, Shadows, and Predators were available to the companies every day in country. As the battalion intelligence officers became more familiar with the assets in theater they used them increasingly throughout the deployment. But the key point is that their pre deployment training did not prepare them for the optimal use of all the assets available to them in the fight, which also translates to the even dimmer understanding that company level intelligence cells had of the ISR assets available to them for tasking.<sup>15</sup>

The CLICs have also had to learn to work with Human Exploitation Teams and Radio Battalion teams in theater as a relationship is not established prior to deployment. In several after action reviews, the companies had difficulty initially understanding command relationships with the HUMINT and SIGINT assets, but figured out working relationships on the go.<sup>16</sup>

At each level of command above the company, intelligence cells provide greater synthesis of the intelligence products from their subordinate units. Adding to this synthesis, as the commanders conduct key leader engagements and integrate interagency actions into their own concept of operations the intelligence sections at higher levels provide greater depth of understanding to the commanders of the dynamic environment.

Feedback on analytic support to counterinsurgency operations stresses the importance of organic assets with the ability to reach back into the greater intelligence apparatus of the United States and share information across the entire theater of operations. In Iraq, the intelligence battalions and radio battalions were used to build a tactical fusion center focusing on all source analysis support the regimental combat teams and the division; however, there's a very real aspect that the further away from the company where the actual information is being collected, the less understanding the analysts have of the operating environment, particularly the human terrain aspects. Despite this phenomenon, there are several ways that analysts support operations at this level. The first and most obvious is that the fusion centers provide overarching assessments of the entire area covered by lower units. This includes making link analysis connections across lower unit boundaries. The fusion centers also provide greater imagery, topographic, SIGINT, and HUMINT capabilities than organic to lower units. Because they typically have larger communications bandwidths, the fusion centers also act as a liaison center between the operational units and national intelligence community.

The Operations of 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Marines in the Nawa district of the Helmand Province of Afghanistan serves as a case study proving the effectiveness of the concept of the CLIC. When the battalion arrived in late June 2009, American and British troops were constantly attacked, and the local population refused to have any contact with them. Within five months, the situation had changed drastically. IED incidents were reduced by ninety percent and the insurgents are increasingly ostracized by the local population, making their operations substantially more difficult. The ISAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Major General Michael T. Flynn attributes a key component of the successes in Nawa to the battalion's

institution of company level intelligence cells and focusing their intelligence collection and analysis on understanding the local populace.<sup>17</sup>

As mentioned above, battalions must staff the company intelligence positions out of hide, pushing out battalion analysts to the companies and turning rifleman into analysts. The example used above of 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Marines also illustrates the importance of having competent personnel conducting the analysis. The battalion was forced to make the difficult decision of pulling some of its best non commissioned officers to fill the analyst role at the company level. The expertise these NCOs gained is then lost to the intelligence community after they are reassigned by the battalion.

## **Bridging the gap from the current to the future fight**

The problem that the Marine Corps is grappling with on where we will fit into the larger department of defense is exacerbated by the ideas about future conflicts which it will fight. In order to maintain the ability to wage successful campaigns against both conventionally armed states and widely dispersed terrorists, and everything in between, The Marine Corps must be as flexible as possible to adapt to a myriad of possible perturbations combining the regular and irregular tactics. The focus described in the Marine Corps operating concepts is clearly the center of the range of military operations, providing critical capabilities to the US Government in crisis response and assuring littoral access.<sup>18</sup>

Joint doctrine defines a crisis an incident or situation involving a threat to a nation, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. As

a naval, expeditionary force in readiness, the Marine Corps is not only optimized for crisis response and limited contingencies, but also the best service for the job. Former Commandant, General Alfred M. Gray remarked, “unless crises diminish significantly in the future, the forces of choice to handle them will likely continue to be aircraft carriers and amphibious forces with embarked Marines.”<sup>19</sup>

The Marine Corps anticipates the crisis response mission set to most likely include security cooperation, foreign humanitarian assistance, civil support, noncombatant evacuations, peace operations, recovery operations, and disaster relief.<sup>20</sup> In support of this direction, the Intelligence Department, Headquarters Marine Corps has built a Roadmap to transition from the current intelligence architecture into an intelligence enterprise with a structure plan to professionalize the analytic capabilities.

## **The Roadmap**

The director of the Marine Corps Intelligence department has provided service level direction implementing an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance enterprise.

MCISR-E is an enterprise encompassing the entire Intelligence Cycle to better assist the USMC operational planning and decision-making processes. It will include the various ISR payloads on airborne platforms, human collectors as well as attended and unattended sensors. MCISR-E evolves the intelligence cycle's steps from sequential to parallel to simultaneous. It includes everything in the cycle from the sensors through the initial posting of the collected data, processing, exploitation, the storing of resultant intelligence products in data stores at the MEFs and at Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) in Quantico. Most importantly, MCISR-E facilitates the more effective and efficient use of intelligence by commanders and staffs. As

MCISR-E evolves, it will be integrated with intelligence unit organizational changes, including training, manning, structure and equipment in execution of intelligence support to EMW.<sup>21</sup>

The most important aspect of the Roadmap is that it provides an overall concept of operation to guide and integrate innovative thinking. Tasks for building the MCISR-E are encapsulated in three transition plans to transform the organization, equipment, and personnel and training. There are two developments in the Organization transition plan that pertain most to the evolution of intelligence analysis. The first is to develop a fixed site at the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity to provide subject matter expertise, data brokerage services, and mentored analysis to increase analytical capacity while maintaining a comparatively small analytic footprint. The second development is to formalize the Company Level Intelligence Cell. This mostly entails figuring out a way to provide analysts to battalions.

The equipment transition plan mostly pertains to streamlining the acquisitions process to ensure the Marine Corps is pursuing cutting edge equipment that will be operationally relevant and rapidly fielded. While analysts will benefit from improvements in the acquisition process brought about by the equipment transition plan, the equipment transition plan does not drive future concepts of operation, so the plan has little impact on the focus of this paper.

The personnel and training plan contains several developments that pertain to the future concept of operations for analysts. The most important development for advancing professionalism in Marine Corps analysis is the development of the center for expeditionary intelligence analysis. The center will be charged with staffing tradecraft groups that break different intelligence problem sets and develop a repertoire of structured models, approaches and techniques that will inform analysts on best practices to support missions across the range of

military operations. It was noted above that battalion intelligence officers felt they were unaware of available collections assets until getting into theater and learning their way around. Although the personnel training plan does not address this issue specifically, the tradecraft concept may alleviate some of the pain associated with directing collections to obtain needed information as the focus of this effort provides analysts with proven approaches to solve complex problems.

## **Analysis Supporting the Range of Military Operations**

Leaders are often faced with decisions on how to allocate resources. As the Marine Corps Intelligence Community transitions to the MCISR-E and turns to implementing changes to support the Marine Corps' return to its amphibious roots, the intelligence community will need to focus resources to support operations. The interest of this section is to explore how well these decisions will allow Marine Corps Intelligence to support operations with analysis across the ROMO. As mentioned in the introduction Warfare is broken into conflicts involving regular and irregular tactics. The ROMO applications examined will be counter insurgency, conventional combat, and hybrid warfare.

## **Counterinsurgency**

Most of the developments implemented in Iraq and Afghanistan have been done to support counterinsurgency operations against irregular tactics. "In some respects, insurgencies have become enabled by modern information technology, many of the principles of counterinsurgency operations remain fundamentally the same. There is a need for sound analysis to determine what capabilities and what mixture of new and old techniques are most appropriate for a particular insurgency. Successful intelligence operations in support of counterinsurgency



operations resemble those of law enforcement agencies. Considerable emphasis is placed on crime scene analysis, social network analysis, interrogation of detainees, and forensics and biometrics. Analysis in support of these police like operations is likely to be considerably different than analysis to support conventional military operations”<sup>22</sup> These implementations are proven successful; however, there remain opportunities to do things better. Of particular note is the gap in preparing infantry battalions for the gamut of ISR capabilities available to them in the theater of operations and the lackluster performance of the organic UAVs.

A second interest is the Marine Corps development of cultural IPB. Cultural IPB will be addressed by the CMEIK to facilitate commander’s ability to create change and positive connections with the population and target local insurgents. Understanding the culture allows a service member to be aware of how his message will be understood. The companies conducting distributed operations understand the importance of mapping out their cultural environment similar to mapping out the feature of their physical environment and gaining and understanding of how this environment will impact their operations.<sup>23</sup>

The CLIC concept comes into its own when units find themselves in counterinsurgency situations where intelligence drives operations. In the after action reviews from both Iraq and Afghanistan, company commanders hail the success of their organic ability to conduct intelligence analysis that leads to High Value Individual (HVI) detentions, cache finds, successful raids, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) discoveries, and the understanding of enemy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)<sup>24</sup> Some of the CLICs produced their own target packages and worked with their battalion S-2 to tie in the collections. Once the operation was conducted the CLICs used the new information collected to inform further analysis and then distribute their intelligence products to their battalions. Some of the CLICs even became adept

at tying in products from supporting SIGINT and HUMINT teams into the information gained by the company through debriefs, patrols, and raids.<sup>25</sup>

One of the challenges that battalion commanders have dealt with in both Iraq and Afghanistan is the presence of interagency partners, non government organizations working in the battalion's area of operations. Although dependent on the ability to build relationships with these outside actors, battalion commanders found involving these actors in information synchronization and sharing meetings to identify key personalities, both good and bad in the local communities. It is important to ensure that the intelligence sections at each level of command maintain cognizance over if not participate in these meetings to facilitate an understanding of the dynamics of the environment and drive collections for information requirements.<sup>26</sup>

## **Conventional Combat**

The Second question is how well the direction of changes began in Iraq and Afghanistan and further developed by the MCISR-E roadmap will support the Marine Corps in high intensity combat. As mentioned above, the tactics in conventional combat operations are markedly different than those employed in irregular conflicts. In conventional combat operations, the intelligence mission is primarily to respond to the requirements imposed by the campaign plan. The premise is that analysis in support of conventional operations is generally well understood.<sup>27</sup>

The professionalization of the analysis processes by capturing best practices for situations including high intensity combat can only benefit. The direction is definitely complementary to the changes implemented by Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper. His overarching goal was to

establish career paths for intelligence officers. The professionalization of analysis with the addition of the senior analysis officer is a natural extension of LtGen Van Riper's plan.

The intelligence process in conventional warfare works in the intuitive direction of top down in the traditional hierarchy, where intelligence preparation of the battlespace is done at each level of planning, and the products inform each lower level of command.

Gaining an understanding of enemy intent is also typically a top down product during the planning phases of conventional operations. Gaining an understanding of enemy doctrinal templates begins at higher echelons and each level of command below bases their understanding of the enemy lower echelons upon the direction from higher. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) are structured to verify their understanding of the enemy doctrine and their assessment of enemy courses of action. In this context, the collections process works very well as higher levels of echelon control tasking the assets.

The most surprising element that may benefit commanders in conventional operations is the impact of cultural intelligence. The danger of transitioning from a force at war to a peacetime force with nothing more than a notional enemy is conveniently reducing enemy capabilities or manufacturing the enemy into a force with warfighting concepts mirror western style military forces instead of sharpening our intelligence assets abilities in understanding enemy motivations and these motivations impacts on how they will fight, and how they will view winning or defeat. As the Marine Corps begins to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the capability that cultural analysis provides, it will likely become an integral part of the standard IPB process against enemies using both conventional and irregular tactics.

In supporting operations, the new intelligence structure will affect the flow of raw intelligence data and finished products. Although the operational tempo will likely preclude analysis during the conduct of an operation at the company level, there will still be scenarios particularly during pauses where patrol debriefs will be important. One particular use that battalions may get from employment of a CLIC during conventional operations is to provide feedback on indicators validating analysis on enemy courses of action. Because there is more of a direct line of support between the CLIC and the battalion intelligence section, the cycle time to provide a commander with a refined view of enemy courses of action could be shortened. Also, the CLICs would be able to provide a sharper picture of the enemy situation and a greater understanding of the environment and the impacts it will have on company operations during their planning process.

## **Hybrid Warfare**

An argument could be made that the Marine Corps could choose to task organize at the battalion level instead of institutionalizing the CLIC concept, only employing the CLIC concept when a unit finds itself fighting an opponent employing irregular tactics. Without institutionalizing the CLIC, units pass up the opportunity to increase their ability to conduct successful operations in the types of conflicts that the leadership throughout the Department of Defense have identified as the most likely threats in the future. Potential enemies have witnessed the United States ability to conduct conventional operations and more than likely will not attempt to enter a conflict against this source of strength. Logic dictates that future adversaries will seek to attack in areas where the forces of the United States are weak. For this reason, the regular forces of future adversaries will likely employ both conventional and irregular tactics against the

United States. In these types of conflicts, the CLIC concept will provide the advantages mentioned above in both the conventional and irregular warfare. IPB will be more dynamic in hybrid warfare, as cultural aspects may not come into focus until after operations begin. Thus, collections will have to be balanced to support operations and support analysis.<sup>28</sup> Once forces come into contact with the enemy and the local populace, a better understanding of the cultural environment will emerge. The cultural component to IPB will possibly allow intelligence analysts to narrow the array of tactics that an enemy is likely to employ in a hybrid warfare type of conflict.

At higher levels of command, the intelligence process is well-established for the range of military operations, but the professionalization of analysis will likely pay big dividends in a complex situation like hybrid war. Having scripted methods to approach problems will allow analysts to quickly begin building a picture of the operating environment as the situation is understood.<sup>29</sup>

## **Recommendations**

The experiences of the company commanders implementing intelligence cells shows that putting the right Marines in the CLIC program is key ability to execute effective intelligence driven counter insurgency operations and provide solid understanding of the company battle space. It must be understood by the companies that the Marines assigned to the CLIC must be solely focused on Intelligence support to the company. Additional duties will impact the CLIC's effectiveness to develop intelligence and conduct analysis. Also, the companies found that it was important to get the battalion intelligence analyst joined to their intelligence cell as early in the pre deployment cycle as possible to allow the company leadership to gain an understanding of

their organic capability to conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). The reality of dispersed company operations in a full-spectrum COIN fight requires fully trained intelligence personnel at the company level prior to deployment because of the limited access to the battalion intelligence staff.<sup>30</sup>

Given these insights, efforts should be made to increase the Table of Organization (T/O) for the battalion intelligence section to aid in institutionalizing the implementation of the CLIC. A six man company intelligence section allows the company to conduct twenty four hour ops and provide platoon representatives to facilitate distributed operations.<sup>31</sup> Giving these Marines to the battalion intelligence section provides the intelligence officer with the flexibility to determine the best way to employ his section based on the character of the warfare in which the unit becomes involved, but the CLIC concept needs to be incorporated as a standard mode of employment for the infantry company to ensure the capability is maintained for use in combat operations.

Training the CLIC in basic intelligence knowledge is just as critical as figuring out manning for the CLIC. The Marine Corps Intelligence Schools have been providing Mobile Training Teams (MTT) – CLIC Mobile Training covering the intelligence cycle and the intelligence systems.<sup>32</sup> Once a battalion begins pre deployment training, the CLIC should be stood up and begin training; mainly centering around predictive analysis, use of intelligence computer systems, Marine Link, Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC), data mining on the SIPRNET, research and analysis techniques, writing INTSUMs, professional writing. Because of the typical composition of the CLIC a crawl/walk/run approach would be best teaching the basics of the intelligence cycle and incorporating building capability sets into successive field exercises.<sup>33</sup>

Intelligence analysts at all levels of command benefit from experience gained by spending time at the company in counterinsurgency operations in particular. Sending Marines down to the company for short durations benefits the company by adding manpower with analytic expertise. When the Marines come back to their parent organizations, they bring back a more accurate picture of the operating environment as well as facilitating a better understanding of how best to support subordinate units with more relevant and useful analytic products. Particularly in an irregular warfare situation, Intelligence analysts at higher levels and especially at fusion centers should have the freedom to move to the information. In an environment where the importance of good intelligence is recognized as a determining factor in a successful operation, it makes sense to remove any obstacles impeding the production of intelligence. <sup>34</sup>

## **Conclusion**

For the greater part of the past decade, the Marine Corps has been involved in combat operations on land operating as a second land army, all but neglecting the amphibious and expeditionary role that it exclusively fills. In the Marine Corps Strategy and Vision 2025, the Commandant directed that the Marine Corps would begin transition back to an amphibious force. In the meantime, much has changed in the operating environment and our thoughts about the future. While the nature of war remains unchanged, adjustments must be made to prepare for emerging trends in the character of war which will likely blend aspects of conventional and irregular warfare. As the Marine Corps embraces distributed operations as a means to successfully counter this trend of hybrid war, the intelligence community must also evolve to support these operations. A key component of this evolution is to understand that intelligence analysis plays a key role in operations against enemies employing irregular warfare. With this in mind, experience and capabilities gained in Iraq and Afghanistan like the company level

intelligence cell should be institutionalized. Because these lower level units will likely not have the benefit of efforts to professionalize analysis capabilities to include greater cultural understanding and prescribed problem solving methods, analysts at higher level should be given the freedom to move to the information. Lastly, tension between supporting conventional and irregular aspects of the operation will necessitate that leaders dynamically prioritize intelligence assets based on changes in the environment over the course of the campaign.

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<sup>1</sup> General James F. Amos. "CMC Confirmation Hearing." Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, 21 September 2010.

<sup>2</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman. *The Lessons of Afghanistan*. Vol. 24. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002, page 30.

<sup>3</sup> —. *Marine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025 Implementation Planning Guidance*.

<sup>4</sup> Major Geoff Baum. Interview by George D. Kinter. *Marine Corps Operating Concepts POC*, January 12, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> United States Marine Corps. *Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century*. Washington D.C., 2008, page 2.

<sup>6</sup> Frank G. Hoffman. "Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars." *Potomac Institute for Policy Studies*. December 2007, page 14.

<sup>7</sup> John A. Nagl. *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002, page 157.

<sup>8</sup> Captain Mark. Schaefer. "Task Force 3d Battalion, 4th Marines S-2 Officer." After Action Report - OIF, 2008.

<sup>9</sup> Schaefer, AAR 2008.

<sup>10</sup> Captain Joshua Plummer, USMC, interview by MCCLL LNO Mr. Chris Wilk. *Battalion S2 Intelligence Officer 1/2* (April 15, 2009).

<sup>11</sup> Plummer, AAR 2009.

<sup>12</sup> Captain Michael Mayne, USMC, interview by MCCLL Mr. Robert Clark. *Company Commander, B Co 1/3* (April 15, 2009).

<sup>13</sup> Mayne, AAR 2009.

<sup>14</sup> 2Bn 24<sup>th</sup> Mar "AAR OIF." After Action Report, 2008.

<sup>15</sup> Captain Joshua Plummer, USMC, interview by MCCLL LNO Mr. Chris Wilk. *Battalion S2 Intelligence Officer 1/2* (April 15, 2009).

3d Battalion, 1st Marines. "OEF 10-1 Initial AAR." After Action Report, Camp Pendleton, November 2010.



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<sup>16</sup> 3/1, AAR November 2010.

Captain Michael Mayne, USMC, interview by MCCLL Mr. Robert Clark. *Company Commander, B Co 1/3* (April 15, 2009).

<sup>17</sup> Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for A New American Security, January 2010, page 13.

<sup>18</sup> Major Geoff Baum. Interview by George D. Kinter. *Marine Corps Operating Concepts POC*, January 12, 2011.

<sup>19</sup> United States Marine Corps. *Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century*. Washington D.C., 2008, preface.

<sup>20</sup> United States Marine Corps. *Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century*. Washington D.C., 2008, page 3.

<sup>21</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Mark. Chandler "MAGIS to MCISR-E Decision Paper." 22 December 2004.

<sup>22</sup> Walter I. Perry, and John Gordon IV. *Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies*. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2008, page xii-xy.

<sup>23</sup> Captain Joshua Plummer, USMC, interview by MCCLL LNO Mr. Chris Wilk. *Battalion S2 Intelligence Officer 1/2* (April 15, 2009).

<sup>24</sup> Brandon J. Gorman. "Company E, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, RCT 7." After Action Report - Afghanistan, 7 August 2010.

<sup>25</sup> LtCol James Woulfe, USMC, interview by USMC Mr. Craig Bevan. *Battalion Commander 3/7* (May 7, 2009).

<sup>26</sup> LtCol James Woulfe, AAR 2009.

<sup>27</sup> Walter I. Perry, and John Gordon IV. *Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies*. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2008, page xiv.

<sup>28</sup> Perry and Gordon, 2008.

<sup>29</sup> Intelligence Department, Headquarters Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise Roadmap*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 28 April 2010.

<sup>30</sup> Brandon J. Gorman. "Company E, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, RCT 7." After Action Report - Afghanistan, 7 August 2010.

<sup>31</sup> Captain Joshua Plummer, USMC, interview by MCCLL LNO Mr. Chris Wilk. *Battalion S2 Intelligence Officer 1/2* (April 15, 2009).

<sup>32</sup> 2Bn 24<sup>th</sup> Mar "AAR OIF." After Action Report, 2008.

<sup>33</sup> Captain Joshua Plummer, USMC, interview by MCCLL LNO Mr. Chris Wilk. *Battalion S2 Intelligence Officer 1/2* (April 15, 2009).

<sup>34</sup> General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for A New American Security, January 2010.

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